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DEMOCRACY IN THE WAKE OF THE CALIFORNIA RECALL
ELIZABETH GARRETT†
The recall of Governor Gray Davis and simultaneous election of
Arnold Schwarzenegger provide a unique window into aspects of elec-
tions and democratic institutions that are not limited to statewide re-
call elections.  Although one must be wary of drawing general conclu-
sions about the political process from an unusual event such as the
statewide recall, this election can serve as a way to think about broader
issues relevant not only to future recalls but also to all candidate and
issue elections in California and throughout the nation.  In this arti-
cle, I will discuss insights that the recent recall provides with respect to
four familiar areas of law and politics.  First, the recall demonstrated
the significant and sometimes troubling role that money plays in
modern campaigns, as well as the difficulty of constructing effective
and comprehensive campaign finance laws.  Second, the unusual
structure of the recall election, where an election for Davis’s successor
was on the same ballot as the recall question, helps to illustrate the
role of political parties in elections.  It suggests that independent and
minor party candidates can be part of an election without necessarily
causing widespread voter confusion.  Third, the more than twenty law-
suits filed before the election was held—with one threatening to delay
the election for months until an en banc panel of the Ninth Circuit
stepped in—demonstrate that litigation is being used more aggres-
sively as political strategy1 in the wake of the Supreme Court’s inter-
vention in the 2000 presidential election.2  Unless courts take a less
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activist role in cases affecting elections, this disturbing trend is likely to
continue.  Finally, I will conclude with a discussion of the interaction
between direct democracy and representative democracy.  In states
with a hybrid system like California, these two forms of democracy in-
fluence each other—a reality that we witnessed in the days before the
recall election and that we are likely to continue to see as Governor
Schwarzenegger threatens to use initiatives to pressure a recalcitrant
legislature to do his bidding.
I.  MONEY, THE RECALL, AND ELECTIONS
California adopted a statewide recall process in 1911 as part of an
effort by John R. Haynes and other progressives to implement a system
in which corrupt officials at both the local and state levels, particularly
those beholden to the mighty Southern Pacific Railroad, could be re-
moved before a regularly scheduled election.3  Before the successful
recall attempt in 2003, groups had attempted to qualify a gubernato-
rial recall for the California ballot thirty-one times, including a previ-
ous attempt aimed at Gray Davis in his first term, but all those efforts
had been unsuccessful.4  The California Constitution requires that
petition circulators gather signatures equal to 12% of those who voted
in the last gubernatorial election.5  Because turnout had been so low
in the lackluster general election between Davis and Republican Bill
Simon, the recall forces needed to collect just 897,158 valid signatures
to qualify the recall for the ballot.6  Even with that relatively low
threshold, the drive would not have succeeded, at least in placing the
recall on the ballot in the fall rather than in March when conditions
would have been more favorable to Davis, without the support of an
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ambitious legislator, Republican Darrell Issa, who contributed around
$2 million to help foot the bill for paid circulators.7  The sophisticated
initiative industry in California includes companies that offer clients a
money-back guarantee if they do not produce enough valid signatures
to qualify something for the ballot; in return, they are paid about
$1.50 per signature.8
Since the Supreme Court held laws banning paid circulators un-
constitutional,9 a group seeking ballot qualification can be certain of
success if it is willing to pay enough.  Money is a sufficient condition
for ballot access, although it does not assure that the ballot question
will pass.  Grassroots groups with broad-based support and energized
members can still rely on volunteers to gather enough signatures, but
even these groups are increasingly turning to paid circulators because
of the guarantee of success.  Recalls are no different from initiatives in
this way—with $2 million dollars in their war chest, the pro-recall
groups easily exceeded the signature threshold by a considerable
amount.  In the end, they turned in petitions with more than 1.36 mil-
lion valid signatures.10
The great influence that money wields in the qualification stage of
direct democracy has justifiably led to calls for reform.  As Daniel
Lowenstein has argued, capitalism is a strange way to allocate ballot
access in a democracy11 (unless one is willing to defend the dubious
proposition that wealth corresponds to merit in the political realm),
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but the reality is that money can buy a place on the ballot, even if it
cannot entirely determine the outcome of the election.  Many of the
reform proposals ostensibly designed to respond to the influence of
money, including those currently being discussed in California in the
wake of the recall, would simply raise the signature threshold.  Cali-
fornia’s threshold for a statewide recall is the lowest in the nation,12
and it is lower even than California’s requirements for recalls of state
legislators and judges.  To recall those officials, petition gatherers
need signatures equal to 20% of the votes cast in the official’s electoral
district.13
The most substantial reform proposal, a constitutional amend-
ment proposed by Assemblyman Mark Ridley-Thomas, would require
signatures equal to 12% of persons registered to vote at the last elec-
tion---not those who actually voted---to place a gubernatorial recall on
the ballot.14  This would change California from the most permissive
state to one of the most rigorous states, and not surprisingly Ridley-
Thomas was a vocal opponent of the recall process.  Other proposals
for reform would bring California in line with other states and require
circulators to gather signatures equal to 25% of those who voted in the
last election.15
Whether California’s relatively low threshold for a gubernatorial
recall is too low is unclear.  After all, there has been only one effort
that has qualified for the ballot in ninety years, and for the past several
decades, the initiative industry in California has surely been sophisti-
cated enough to realize that a substantial war chest could qualify a re-
call just as it can an initiative.  Nothing in the law or constitution
changed in 2003 that made a recall suddenly more possible than it was
five or ten years before, although the low turnout in the 2002 general
election meant that fewer signatures were required to meet the 12%
threshold.  The success of the 2003 recall has made the process sali-
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ent; thus, it is likely that we will see an increase in the attempts to qual-
ify statewide recalls.  Nonetheless, any substantial increase in the
number of signatures seems motivated more by a dislike of direct de-
mocracy than by a genuine desire to improve the process.  In essence,
these proposals reduce the number of recalls by raising the cost of
petition drives.  Rather than increasing the price of ballot access,
thereby ensuring that only the well funded will have the ability to use
the recall tool, policymakers and voters should formulate reforms con-
sistent with the purpose of direct democracy.
The goal of direct democracy, whether ever realized or not,16 is to
allow the people to circumvent the traditional legislative process when
it is dominated by powerful narrow interests.  Although representing
only a minority, such interest groups can disproportionately affect the
legislative process either by taking advantage of vetogates to block
change or by gaining benefits through logrolling.  Elected officials
may be extremely attentive to the wishes of organized groups with in-
tense preferences because these groups have the ability to monitor the
legislature closely and to reward their supporters with campaign con-
tributions and other benefits.  The initiative, referendum and recall
processes are intended to give grassroots movements that plausibly
represent majority wishes methods to discipline elected agents when
they are more responsive to minority interests rather than to the
larger electorate.  The design of direct democracy should be consis-
tent with the objective of empowering the relatively unorganized many
as they combat the clout of the organized but impassioned few in the
legislative arena.
Signature thresholds were intended to serve as a signal of signifi-
cant grassroots support for an issue before it was elevated to the ballot.
At the time this mechanism was chosen as the triggering event for bal-
lot access, the drafters of direct democracy provisions did not envision
the widespread use of paid circulators or the involvement of a profes-
sionalized initiative industry of consultants.  Simply raising the thresh-
olds in response to the new reality may mean that fewer recalls will
occur, but it does not serve the populist objectives of direct democ-
racy.  Instead, it strengthens the hand of those who can afford to
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spend substantial money on a petition drive and makes it even harder
for all-volunteer efforts to succeed.  For example, had it been in place
in 2003, the Ridley-Thomas proposal would have required a successful
recall drive to get more than 1.8 million signatures---more than double
that required to qualify the Davis recall.17  Raising signature thresholds
alone means that many groups will be priced out of the market, in-
cluding many truly grassroots groups.  Thus, the few issues that qualify
for the ballot will most certainly be the product of special-interest
money and organization.  Such ballot questions may not be able to
win in the election,18 although savvy groups will work to qualify issues
that resonate with voters and to frame ballot questions so that they
seem consistent with the majority’s preferences.  Furthermore, merely
qualifying a recall and triggering an election may be sufficient to dis-
rupt the political process in a way that serves proponents’ interests,
regardless of the outcome.19
More creative reform is required to reconfigure the ballot access
process so it serves the populist objectives of recall and initiative.  For
example, Daniel Lowenstein and Robert Stern have proposed a volun-
teer bonus system that would require groups using paid workers to
obtain more signatures than groups exclusively using volunteers.20
There are limitations to this proposal, and it may run afoul of the First
Amendment.21  Nonetheless, it is a promising idea, it is more consis-
tent with the goals of recall and initiative, and it might pass constitu-
tional muster if justified by reference to the purpose of signature
thresholds.  Thresholds are designed to demonstrate popular support.
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Groups that can persuade people to volunteer to circulate petitions
have already produced one convincing signal of such support and
should not need to gather as many signatures as an additional sign of
popularity.
Lowenstein has also suggested requiring that those who support a
recall or initiative campaign go to a firehouse, library, or other public
location to sign the petition.  As part of this proposal, he supports re-
ducing the number of signatures required for ballot qualification be-
cause the greater effort required to sign an initiative would provide a
reliable indicator of support and thus the importance of the signal of
mere numbers would be reduced.22  Making it more costly for voters to
sign a petition—in terms of opportunity costs—would make signatures
more meaningful.  It would be difficult for paid circulators to con-
vince people to expend their time and energy traveling to a petition
site unless the potential signers really supported the ballot question.
In contrast, petition circulators report that they can convince voters to
take a minute or two to sign almost any petition on their way into a
Wal-Mart or during a stroll through a shopping center.  Lowenstein’s
proposal is consistent with the objectives of direct democracy in a way
that the more typical proposals to increase signature thresholds are
not.  Of course, it is not foolproof.  Presumably, well heeled interests
could provide voters with transportation to and from the venues
where petitions are available; however, it is less likely that voters who
care nothing about the ballot issue would be willing to take the bus to
the firehouse.  Remember that although petition circulators can be
paid, those who sign petitions cannot be compensated.
Other interesting reform proposals would allow voters to “sign”
petitions on the Internet, thereby reducing the cost of ballot qualifica-
tion and allowing grassroots groups to qualify issues for the ballot
more easily.  This reform would result in many more recalls and initia-
tives and would not eliminate the influence of money, but it would
open the process up to grassroots groups with widespread popular
support.  The innovative use of the Internet by Howard Dean in his
unsuccessful quest for the Democratic presidential nomination re-
vealed that it can be a powerful tool to harness real grassroots support.
For example, more than 59% of the over $51 million raised by Dean
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in the first quarter of 2004 came in increments of $200 or less,23 many
of which were raised online.24  Any reform of direct democracy that
uses the Internet to empower grassroots movements should be ac-
companied by an increase in the signature threshold, and perhaps it
could also be combined with a volunteer bonus approach.  Substan-
tially increasing the signature threshold is a defensible reform only if
it is passed together with a change in circulation methods which fa-
vors, or at least does not disadvantage, grassroots organizations.
One other reform to combat the role of money in petition drives,
which should be adopted with other proposals, is to require that paid
circulators wear badges identifying them as PAID and also providing
information about which groups or individuals are footing the bill.25
Information that the circulator is a hired gun may well turn some vot-
ers off and make signature gathering more difficult.  Politicians be-
lieve such information affects voter behavior because they work to
publicize that their opponents are using paid circulators as a way to
tarnish a petition drive and defeat the ballot question.  A badge desig-
nating a circulator as PAID might encourage voters to ask about the
source of the payment, thereby alerting them to the interests behind
the petition drive.  In issue elections, an effective voter shortcut is pro-
vided by information that reveals which groups support and which
oppose an initiative and the intensity of their views.26  A signal like a
PAID badge, which prompts further inquiry, may provide voters with
information that allows them to reach better conclusions about whether
they support placing a particular question on the ballot.  Further-
more, if there is a stigma associated with paid circulators, then this
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information alone, which is apparent from the badge, could reduce
the effectiveness of money in petition drives.27
Money was an important part of the 2003 recall story not just in
the qualification stage, but also in the campaign itself.  The role of
money in the campaign and the sources of money used by candidates
and recall organizations reflect the influence of money generally in
candidate and issue elections.  The bifurcated nature of the recall
election meant that the regulatory regime for campaign finance in the
campaign was bifurcated as well.  Only those candidates running for
governor in the second part of the election were limited by the state’s
campaign laws to accepting contributions no greater than $21,200
from each individual.  Committees formed to campaign for or against
the recall—even those controlled by candidates or by Gray Davis—
were not subject to contribution limits, although they were required to
comply with disclosure rules.  This reality led to a variety of strategies
by candidates to evade the effect of contribution limitations.
First, very wealthy candidates could spend as much of their own
money as they wished because Supreme Court jurisprudence has disal-
lowed expenditure limits while upholding contribution limits.28  The
largest single contributor in the entire election was Arnold Schwar-
zenegger, who spent over $10.5 million of his own money, mainly
through his “Californians for Schwarzenegger” committee.29  The theme
of his successful campaign was that he would stand for the people
against special interests, and, as part of that strategy, he announced
that he would not take money from special interests but would instead
spend his own money.  He is rich enough, he told voters, that he
would be beholden to no one.30  In the end, he did accept substantial
campaign contributions from a variety of interests including real es-
tate developers, car dealers, insurance interests, and financial institu-
tions.31  It turned out that his definition of “special interests” included
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only Indian tribes and labor unions.32  However, he also self-financed a
great portion of his campaign, demonstrating the advantages for mul-
timillionaires willing to spend their own money in a campaign system
where contributions from others are limited but overall expenditures
are not.  It is not clear that Schwarzenegger needed to spend so much
money in political advertising, because the celebrity status that allowed
him to amass wealth also ensured him virtually unlimited media atten-
tion, not only from the traditional news outlets but also from enter-
tainment shows and the international press corps.
Other millionaire candidates who spent substantial sums on their
campaigns were Peter Ueberroth, a Republican running as an inde-
pendent who ultimately dropped out of the race, and Garrett Grue-
ner, a virtually unknown candidate who spent about $460 for each
vote he received.33  Thus, being a millionaire willing to spend money
on a campaign is not a sufficient condition for electoral success, but it
is increasingly a necessary one given the structure of the campaign
finance rules.
A second evasive tactic for candidates was to take advantage of
loopholes in the rules regulating campaign finance in candidate elec-
tions.  The combination of contribution limitations and millionaire
competitors led Cruz Bustamante, the Democratic Lieutenant Gover-
nor, to resort to questionable, and ultimately impermissible, tactics to
evade the $21,200 cap on contributions.  Unlike the new federal law,34
the California campaign laws do not increase contribution limits for
those who are running against self-financed millionaires.  In fall 2003,
Bustamante still had an active campaign account that had been estab-
                                                                                                                                
groups since the election.  See Dan Morain, Governor Raises $1 Million Since Election, L.A.
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sions of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), Pub. L. No. 107-155,
116 Stat. 81 (codified in scattered sections of 2, 18, 28, 36, 47 U.S.C.).  See McConnell v.
FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 124 S. Ct. 619, 710 (2003) (finding provision nonjusticiable).
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lished before the enactment of the current restrictions.  He argued
that the campaign finance limitations did not apply to contributions
made to that account.  This account took nearly $4 million from do-
nors who exceeded the contribution limit, including $1.5 million from
the Viejas Tribal Government, an Indian tribe with substantial inter-
ests in casinos.35  Tribes and organized labor also spent $6.3 million in
independent expenditures to support Bustamante;36 contribution lim-
its do not apply to funds raised for such expenditures.
Bustamante’s efforts to evade the contribution limits may be un-
derstandable given the wealth of his competitors and the shortened
campaign period of the recall, but they ultimately backfired.  The
Lieutenant Governor was attacked in the press and by other candi-
dates as the tool of special interests, an argument that resonated with
voters who had been turned off by Davis’s similar fundraising connec-
tions to interest groups.  Like Bustamante, Davis is not personally
wealthy, so he could compete against millionaire competitors like Bill
Simon only by aggressively raising money from well-heeled interest
groups.  Ironically, when the populace wants to elect an “ordinary per-
son” who appears to be independent from interest groups, current
campaign laws may leave voters only with a field of extraordinarily rich
people.  Bustamante was successfully sued by a Republican state sena-
tor who argued that the Lieutenant Governor could not evade contri-
bution limits by using the old campaign account.37  Although by the
time of the lawsuit most of the money had been spent for television
advertisements and thus had already affected the election, the judicial
decision prompted further negative publicity.
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to evade contribution limits.  Nancy Vogel, Bustamante Accused of Violations, L.A. TIMES,
Jan. 8, 2004, at B1 (noting that the FPPC filed civil suit “because [FPPC] officials con-
sidered the alleged violations egregious and deserving of tougher penalties that could
be obtained only in court”).  This latter case was settled when Bustamante agreed to
pay a $263,000 penalty, the largest ever paid for a violation of the state’s campaign
finance law. The fine was paid with extra campaign funds by Bustamante’s campaign
committee.  Tim Reiterman & Jennifer Warren, Lt. Gov. Agrees to Pay Hefty Fine, L.A.
TIMES, Apr. 14, 2004, at B1.
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A third method of evasion was possible because the election for
governor was held at the same time as an election on two initiatives
and on the recall itself.  Contributions relating to direct democracy—
whether to an initiative or to the recall election—are not limited by
state law.  To counteract charges of inappropriate special interest in-
fluence but still get some benefit from the large contributions from
tribes and labor unions, Bustamante tried to take advantage of this
bifurcation.  He transferred the money collected in his old campaign
account, in violation of the rules applying to candidate elections, to a
committee he organized to oppose Proposition 54, the “Racial Privacy
Initiative.”38  This initiative, the brainchild of anti-affirmative action
activist Ward Connerly, would have prohibited the state from gather-
ing data which classified people by race or ethnicity.39  The money
played a large role in defeating the initiative, a matter important both
to Bustamante and his constituents, and it allowed the Lieutenant
Governor to spend the money in a way designed also to help his cam-
paign.  He appeared in many of the ads, and the people who were
likely to turn out to vote against Proposition 54 were also likely to vote
for him.  Bustamante was not the first California gubernatorial candi-
date to use an initiative to improve his electoral chances.  Jerry Brown
used an initiative on campaign finance and lobbying reform to under-
score his commitment to clean government, and Pete Wilson used an
initiative denying state-provided services to undocumented workers to
turn out voters he hoped would also vote for him.40
Other candidates used committees organized to oppose or sup-
port the recall to raise unlimited amounts of money that they could
use to influence both parts of the election.  First, recall target Gray
Davis raised nearly $18.3 million through his antirecall committee
“Californians Against the Costly Recall of the Governor,” a sum made
possible by the absence of contribution limitations.41  Thus, because
he was operating under different rules than those facing Bustamante,
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See Alexa H. Bluth, Judge to Bustamante:  Prove You Spent Funds, SACRAMENTO
BEE, Sept. 27, 2003, http://www.sacbee.com/content/politics/recall/story/
7491938p-8434102c.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2004) (reporting that a Sacramento
judge ordered Bustamante to account for funds used after they were transferred to the
anti-Proposition 54 committee).
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Proposition 54, Prohibition Against Classifying by Race by State and Other Pub-
lic Entities, available at http://vote2003.ss.ca.gov/propositions/2-3-prop-54.html (last
visited Sept. 20, 2004).
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DAVID D. SCHMIDT, CITIZEN LAWMAKERS:  THE BALLOT INITIATIVE REVOLUTION
28 (1989); PETER SCHRAG, PARADISE LOST:  CALIFORNIA’S EXPERIENCE, AMERICA’S
FUTURE 225-34 (1998).
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Morain, supra note 36, at B6.
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Davis, a long-time civil servant and man of modest economic means,
was able to legally accumulate a war chest comparable to that of his
rich competitor.  However, the need to raise large sums of money in
this campaign and in past ones, possible in many cases only by going
to interests that would be vitally affected by decisions Davis made in
office, led to public dissatisfaction with Davis and fueled the recall ef-
fort.  Thus, his success in fundraising was a double-edged sword in the
political realm.
The bifurcated campaign finance system also allowed candidates
for governor to form separate pro-recall committees and raise unre-
stricted money for those efforts.  For example, Schwarzenegger’s “To-
tal Recall” committee raised over $4.5 million that it spent largely on
advertisements supporting the recall.42  As with Bustamante’s ads
against Proposition 54, the Total Recall advertisements featured
Schwarzenegger as spokesman.  Unless a viewer noticed the fine print
identifying the sponsor of the ad, she would be hard-pressed to tell the
difference between one funded by the Schwarzenegger campaign
committee and one paid for by the “Total Recall” committee.  Schwar-
zenegger has continued to use the bifurcation of campaign finance
laws to his advantage.  He is willing to implement some of his policies
through voter initiatives, and he has been active in raising money to
fund those efforts.43  Schwarzenegger has organized a committee
called the “Governor Schwarzenegger’s California Recovery Team”
that is solely involved in supporting ballot measures vital to imple-
menting the Governor’s agenda.44  For the first year of his term he was
unfettered by contribution limits in fundraising for his ballot ques-
                                                          
42
See CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, CAMPAIGN FINANCE ACTIVITY:  ARNOLD SCHWAR-
ZENEGGER’S TOTAL RECALL COMMITTEE, VOTE YES TO RECALL GRAY DAVIS, at
http://cal-access.ss.ca.gov/Campaign/Committees/Detail.aspx?id=1257330&session=2003
(last visited Sept. 20, 2004) (outlining contributions to, and expenditures of, the “Total
Recall” committee).
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For example, on November 17, 2003, at a lunch with the California Chamber of
Commerce, the new governor announced plans to use the initiative process to enact
various reforms, including a reform of the workers’ compensation system.  Peter
Nicholas & Joe Mathews, Schwarzenegger Sworn In, Rescinds Car Tax Increase, L.A. TIMES,
Nov. 18, 2003, at A1 (discussing the first actions taken by Schwarzenegger after being
sworn in); see also infra notes 147-58 and accompanying text (discussing use of initia-
tives as part of his governing strategy).
44
See Peter Nicholas, Fundraiser “Unfortunate,” Governor’s Aides Concede, L.A. TIMES,
Feb. 18, 2004, at B6 (discussing the ethical implications of the lack of contribution
limits for ballot measures committees); see also CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, CAMPAIGN FINANCE
ACTIVITY:  SCHWARZENEGGER’S CALIFORNIA RECOVERY TEAM, GOVERNOR, at http://cal-
access.ss.ca.gov/Campaign/Committees/Detail.aspx?id=1261406&session=2003 (last
visited Sept. 20, 2004) (listing the total value of contributions made to “Schwarzeneg-
ger’s California Recovery Team”).
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tions, but it is incredibly naïve to think that Schwarzenegger is less
grateful to interests that fund ballot questions vital to his agenda (and
to his reelection) than to those who contribute directly to his cam-
paign committee.
Thus, the recall campaign presented an unusual example of the
usual machinations apparent when candidates devise strategies within
a system of some limitations, many loopholes and unregulated chan-
nels of money, and different rules for different kinds of campaigns
that can nonetheless be run to complement each other.  Some loop-
holes can be closed, as occurred with Bustamante’s 2002 campaign
committee.  In addition, the California Fair Political Practices Com-
mission (FPPC) has announced plans to apply contribution limits to
ballot-initiative campaign committees controlled by candidates and
office holders.45  Effective after November’s elections, the new regula-
tions are clearly a response to Schwarzenegger’s aggressive exploita-
tion of the bifurcated rules.  Supreme Court jurisprudence suggests
that fewer limitations on campaign finance are allowed in the context
of initiatives than in candidate elections,46 so it is likely the new restric-
tions on issue committees will be challenged in Court.  As long as
there are states with hybrid systems with some bifurcation of campaign
rules, candidates can use ballot questions to influence their elections
and to evade some of the restrictions on candidate committees.47  Un-
regulated avenues for campaign fundraising and spending are increas-
ingly important in the wake of McConnell v. FEC, where the Supreme
Court upheld the new federal law that cut off methods used in the
past to evade contribution limitations, such as soft money raised by
political parties.  The recall election dramatically emphasizes the real-
ity of campaign finance regulation:  effective regulation is very difficult
because wily political actors learn how to take advantage of unregu-
lated avenues of influence.48
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Gabrielle Banks, New Limits on Initiative Campaigns, L.A. TIMES, June 26, 2004, at
B1.
46
See Citizens Against Rent Control/Coalition for Fair Hous. v. City of Berkeley,
454 U.S. 290, 300 (1981) (holding that a legislative limitation on contributions to
committees formed to support or oppose ballot measures contravened First Amend-
ment rights of association and expression); First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435
U.S. 765, 775-95 (1978) (finding a Massachusetts statute prohibiting corporate expen-
ditures regarding individual income tax referenda violative of the First Amendment).
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For a discussion of the ability of candidates to take advantage of loopholes and
unregulated avenues of spending money, see Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan,
The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance Reform, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1705 (1999).  See also
McConnell v. FEC, 124 S.Ct. 619, 706 (2003) (concluding that “[m]oney, like water,
will always find an outlet”).
48
For a discussion of this pragmatic objection to campaign finance, see Elizabeth
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Even if reformers wanted to plug some of the holes in the regula-
tory system, it is not clear that contribution limits can be extended fully
into a recall campaign.  Certainly, some contribution limits can be justi-
fied using the state interests that support restrictions in ordinary candi-
date elections.  For example, the incumbent governor is susceptible to
quid pro quo corruption in the same way that any candidate for elected
office is, as are candidates affiliated with recall committees.  Indeed, a
sitting governor seeking to retain her job in the face of a recall may be
more susceptible to quid pro quo corruption, and certainly she is more
able to make credible promises of benefits since she is in office and has
the power to immediately reward supporters.  Thus, current jurispru-
dence might support the application of contribution limitations to
committees these politicians control, but it is unlikely to support com-
prehensive campaign finance regulation of other participants in a re-
call.  Not all committees organized to support or oppose the recall are
coordinated with candidates; some, and perhaps a good number, are
legitimately focused on the recall itself without any connection to either
the incumbent or a potential successor.  They are more like traditional
initiative campaign committees; thus, First Amendment challenges to
contribution restrictions are likely to succeed.49  Bifurcation of the rules
within the recall campaign itself would be undesirable.  To apply limits
only to groups controlled by the target of the recall and not to many of
the committees seeking his ouster seems even more inequitable than
the current system for candidate elections where self-financed million-
aires are at an advantage relative to those of more modest means.  If the
FPPC’s decision to apply campaign restrictions only to some issue
committees, namely those controlled by candidates and officeholders,
survives judicial attack, we will develop experience with a different sort
of bifurcation of campaign rules and will learn how strategists react to
the new regime.  These lessons can be applied in the more unusual
context of recall campaigns.
                                                                                                                                
Garrett, The Future of Campaign Finance Reform Laws in the Courts and in Congress, 27
OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 665, 672-73 (2002).
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If McConnell is a signal that the Court may be moving toward accepting a state
interest based more on equality concerns or the right for all to participate in self-
government, campaign finance regulation beyond disclosure could be permissible in
the direct democracy context.  See Richard L. Hasen, Buckley Is Dead, Long Live Buck-
ley:  The New Campaign Finance Incoherence of McConnell v. Federal Election Commis-
sion, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 31, 57-60 (2004) (explaining why McConnell “appears to be a
transitional case, with even stronger signals pointing to the participatory self-
government rationale”).  It is still too early, however, to tell if McConnell is beginning to
articulate new state interest in the regulation of campaign speech that could support
contribution and expenditure limits in ballot question contests.
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II.  POLITICAL PARTIES
One hundred thirty-five candidates appeared on the recall ballot in
the election to succeed Governor Davis in the event that he was re-
called.50  This glut of candidates was made possible by poorly drafted
statutes that provided no clear rules for ballot access and by the rules
chosen by the Secretary of State in the exercise of his discretion as the
chief election officer, which posed only minor hurdles for people seek-
ing to add “Gubernatorial Candidate” to their resumes.51  In the early
days of recall in California, potential candidates had to obtain signa-
tures equal to 1% of those who voted in the last election.52  At the time
of the adoption of this constitutional provision, that requirement meant
that candidates would have needed about 4000 signatures.53  This provi-
sion, originally in the constitution and then placed in statute, was re-
pealed in 1976 and replaced with directions to use “the manner pre-
scribed for nominating a candidate to that office in a regular election.”54
However, the provision regulating ballot access for primary elections
explicitly states that it does not apply to recall elections.55
In the face of a conflicting and badly drafted statutory scheme, the
Secretary of State determined that the very permissive ballot access rules
for primary elections would be used, notwithstanding the express lan-
guage to the contrary.  Thus, candidates needed only to obtain either
65 signatures and pay $3500 or to obtain 10,000 signatures.56  That
opened the door for the multitude of candidates, the majority of whom
ran for reasons other than the hope of winning.  A few were concerned
with broadly publicizing particular political issues or concerns.  Some,
like Gary Coleman, the former child actor, Mary Carey, the current
porn star, and Gallagher, the melon-smashing comedian, ran to en-
hance their visibility in other careers.  Perhaps many ran to be able to
claim at future family reunions that they once were candidates for gov-
ernor.
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Official Sample Ballot and Voter Instructions, October 7, 2003 Special Election
(on file with author).
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Fredric Woocher, Comments at the Post-Mortem Conference on the Recall at
USC Law School (Nov. 14, 2003) (student notes available at http://lawweb.usc.edu/






CAL. ELEC. CODE § 11381 (West 2003); see also Burton v. Shelley, No. S117834,
2003 WL 21962000, at *4-5 (Cal. Aug. 7, 2003) (providing the drafting history of the
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CAL. ELEC. CODE § 8000 (West 2003).
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FAQS ABOUT RECALLS, supra note 6.
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This ballot, unusual in statewide races which typically feature two
or a few more candidates for each position,57 is noteworthy for more
than the carnival aspect of dozens of candidates listing interesting pro-
fessions such as “retired meat packer,” “fathers’ issues author,” and
“marijuana legalization attorney.” 58  Two other features deserve men-
tion because of their relevance in more typical elections.  First, the
long and unusual ballot presents a case study of the potential for voter
confusion.  Second, the lack of party control over access to the general
election ballot had significant effects on which candidates appeared
on the ballot and which were frontrunners.  To take the most dra-
matic example, Arnold Schwarzenegger, who might not have survived
a closed party primary, is now the Governor of California.
This election is a case study of unusual ballots and the potential
for voter confusion.  Judges dealing with challenges to strict ballot ac-
cess provisions are often faced with claims by state officials that the
possibility of voter confusion justifies rigorous regulation of who can
get on the ballot.  Defenders of access restrictions argue that voters
confronted with a ballot containing many candidates for one office, or
with ballot notations beyond party affiliation, will not be able to vote
accurately because they will be overwhelmed.  Virtually none of the
judicial cases includes actual evidence of voter confusion; instead,
mere assertion of this phenomenon is usually accepted as a sufficient
state interest to protect the regulation from constitutional attack.59
The recall ballot provides a good test of whether relatively unlim-
ited ballot access results in confused voters.  The ballot had other fea-
tures that might be expected to contribute to confusion.  It provided
next to each candidate’s name a notation of party affiliation and oc-
cupation.60  Furthermore, candidates were listed in random order, to
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Large numbers of candidates are not unheard of in races for local elections.
See, e.g., Sherry Bebitch Jeffe, Opinion, The Name Game:  With 52-–Count ‘Em 52-–People
Running for Office, Will a Vision of L.A. Be Lost in the Shuffle?, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1993, at
M1 (discussing Jerry Brown’s election to the Los Angeles Community College Board in
1969 out of a field of 133 candidates).
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See, e.g., Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 370 (1997)
(holding that antifusion laws prohibiting candidates from being affiliated on a ballot
with multiple political parties do not violate First and Fourteenth Amendment associa-
tional rights); Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 195-96 (1986) (finding
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See Monika L. McDermott, Candidate Occupations and Voter Information
Shortcuts (2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (assessing the impor-
tance of information about a candidate’s occupation as a voting cue).
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minimize first-order effects,61 and the order was changed from district
to district, meaning that effective voter education using sample ballots
had to be different in each district.  Finally, voting technology in some
counties further complicated the ballot; for example, punch card bal-
lots required seven pages to list all the candidates.  Election officials
worried that voters would try to vote for one candidate per page,
rather than just one in the list of 135.
Many observers predicted confusion in large part because of the
ballot design, but also because of the reduced numbers of polling
places, some of which were relocated from past elections.  There is
evidence of some confusion about the nature of the race.  For exam-
ple, Roderick Kiewiet and Michael Alvarez, who conducted telephone
surveys of voters, found that over 6% of Davis supporters intended to
vote “yes” on the recall—a vote clearly contrary to their preferences.
These voters were less educated in general than other voters, suggest-
ing that they were less likely to understand the unusual format.62  An-
other study by these authors and others also suggests that other voting
mistakes occurred because the obscure candidates whose names ap-
peared either immediately above or immediately below the names of
Schwarzenegger, Bustamante, or McClintock picked up more votes
than would have been predicted.  Presumably, most of these votes
were mistakes.63  Furthermore, subsequent studies have suggested that
the use of punch card ballots led to significantly more undervoting
than occurred in precincts using different technology.64  The under-
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See Jon A. Krosnick et al., An Unrecognized Need for Ballot Reform:  The Effects of
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PROSPECTS OF AMERICAN ELECTION REFORM 51, 68 (Ann N. Crigler et al. eds., 2004)
(providing evidence that “there is more than a slim chance that name order could
affect the outcome of a close election,” thus advocating that states “assign positions to
all candidates equally often across precincts”); see also Daniel E. Ho & Kosuke Imai,
Randomization Inference with Natural Experiments:  An Analysis of Ballot Effects in
the 2003 California Recall Election 20 (Sept. 1, 2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with author) (finding that candidates gained votes when they were listed on the first
page of the ballot).
62
D. Roderick Kiewiet, Comments at the Post-Mortem Conference on the Recall at
USC Law School (Nov. 14, 2003) (student notes available at http://lawweb.usc.edu/
cslp/conferences/post-mortem_recall_03.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2004)) (from
work with Michael Alvarez and forthcoming as a book); see also R. Michael Alvarez et
al., The Complexity of the California Recall Election, 37 PS:  POL. SCI. & POL. 23, 24 (2004)
(discussing a study of the various election day problems surrounding the California
recall).
63
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See generally Michael P. McDonald, California Recall Voting:  Nuggets of California
Gold for Voting Behavior, FORUM, Vol. 1, Issue 4, Art. 6 (2003) (analyzing voter participa-
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vote was not significant enough to cast the results of the election into
doubt because the recall and Schwarzenegger both won so decisively.
Notwithstanding these problems, none of which was substantial
enough to affect the outcome of the election, the recall experience
suggests that most voters are able to cope with some complexity in
ballots.  They can handle a ballot with more than two candidates for
each office—and perhaps with significantly more than two candi-
dates.  Alvarez and Kiewiet’s study, which focused on the choice
among Davis, Schwarzenegger, Bustamante, and McClintock, sup-
ports the conclusion that voters cast their ballots in ways that were
consistent with their preferences.  Moreover, even though the multi-
candidate ballot raised the specter of vote cycling or other irrationali-
ties of voting, the study demonstrates that the Condorcet winner in
all pair-wise contests—Schwarzenegger—won the plurality voting as
well.65  That was not an inevitable result, and Kiewiet’s discussion sets
out ways that an irrational result could have emerged under the recall
format, but it is a heartening result all the same.66  At the least, state
officials relying on voter confusion to support stringent regulation of
ballot access ought to be required to provide more than mere asser-
tions in the political and judicial arenas.  Courts should be more
skeptical of these claims and understand that they are likely to be su-
perficially neutral rationales offered for regulations designed to pro-
tect the two major parties and to lock out new voices.67  The recall
election should also encourage reformers to seek greater ballot access
in traditional candidate elections for independent and third-party
candidates.  If voters can handle a somewhat more complicated bal-
lot, then much of the state’s rationale for severely restricting ballot
access has been undermined.  Given the hostility of major-party offi-
cials to broader ballot access, reformers may need to turn to the ini-
tiative process to effect such changes.
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Markets:  Partisan Lockups of the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643 (1998) (describ-
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Although many of the 135 candidacies were frivolous, the Califor-
nia recall campaign was unusual because several serious minor-party
and independent candidates were relatively high-profile and partici-
pated in a series of statewide debates.  In addition to two Republicans,
Tom McClintock and Arnold Schwarzenegger, and Democrat Cruz
Bustamante, independent candidates Arianna Huffington and Peter
Ueberroth and Green Party candidate Peter Camejo received rela-
tively extensive media coverage.  Huffington benefited from her ce-
lebrity as an author, talk-show regular, and former wife of a wealthy
politician.  Ueberroth was a minor celebrity as former baseball com-
missioner, and he also spent some of his own fortune to gain media
attention.  Camejo was able to garner sufficient support in the polls to
be included in televised debates.  Inclusion of minor-party candidates
and independents in a widely televised debate with all the major can-
didates is unusual in California.68
The debate that included all six candidates did not support the
notion that multicandidate debates are appreciably more confusing or
chaotic than debates with only the two major candidates.69  Just as Ross
Perot’s inclusion in the 1992 presidential debates focused attention on
issues that the major-party candidates hoped to avoid, such as the fed-
eral budget deficit, the participation of candidates other than the two
leading contenders in gubernatorial debates altered the topics cov-
ered and the arguments made.  For example, Huffington, although
generally clownish and extreme, challenged Bustamante on the con-
tributions to his campaign by Indian tribes in a way that increased the
salience of the issue.  Camejo and McClintock presented the most de-
tailed substantive proposals of all the candidates, providing voters a
range of policies to consider and providing a sharp contrast to the vir-
tually policy-free presentation of Schwarzenegger.  The debate was not
a model of rational argumentation, of course, but it was no worse than
many less crowded ones, and any absurdities could be attributed as
often to the major candidates as to the minor-party and independent
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See Lee Romney, Green Party’s Man Is Tickled Pink over Debate, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 5,
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candidates.  Many Californians indicated that the televised debate in
which Schwarzenegger, Bustamante, McClintock, Camejo, and
Huffington participated was valuable in making up their minds at the
polls.70
Although none of the independents nor the Green Party candi-
date had a chance of being elected, winning elections is not the role
of minor parties in the American political system.  As Justice Thur-
good Marshall observed in his dissent in Munro v. Socialist Workers
Party, “[t]he minor party’s often unconventional positions broaden
political debate, expand the range of issues with which the electorate
is concerned, and influence the positions of the majority, in some in-
stances ultimately becoming majority positions.”71  To play this role in
public debate, however, minor parties and independent candidates
need press coverage.  In this election, celebrity ensured media atten-
tion for some candidates, such as Huffington.  But for others, like
Camejo, the ability to qualify for ballot access relatively easily and in-
clusion in widely televised debates allowed them to put forward new
ideas and to challenge the traditional positions of the major party
candidates.
Even though vast confusion did not result, California statutes
should be amended to establish a clear process for access to the sec-
ond part of the recall ballot.  California avoided some of the pitfalls
possible under the current recall format because of the decisive vic-
tories for pro-recall forces and for Schwarzenegger.  A not-
insignificant number of signatures should be required for ballot ac-
cess, although the threshold must be realistic in the context of a
condensed campaign period.  The old constitutional standard—1%
of those who voted in the last election—would now require more
than 75,000 signatures,72 too onerous for candidates who would need
to qualify quickly.  Half that number of signatures would be a more
reasonable threshold to discourage frivolous candidacies but still
allow the possibility of access for serious minor party and independ-
ent candidates.
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Some reformers have suggested eliminating the election for a suc-
cessor and allowing the Lieutenant Governor to take over if the gov-
ernor is recalled.73  This reform is problematic and, not surprisingly,
often supported by those generally hostile to direct democracy.  Be-
cause the Governor and Lieutenant Governor are elected separately in
California and can be from different parties, such a reform could en-
courage the Lieutenant Governor’s party to mount a recall drive and
might erode any possibility of cooperation between the two officials.
When the two top officers are from the same party, the voter disgust
that leads to a recall is likely to be targeted at the administration, and
the recall should provide an opportunity to begin governing with a
clean slate.  Moreover, if the recall stems from popular belief that the
incumbent leaders are too attentive to powerful economic or other
special interests, voters may want the opportunity to elect an outsider,
as they did in 2003.  For these reasons, most states that allow guberna-
torial recalls also provide for an election of a successor, not the auto-
matic elevation of the second-in-command.  On the other hand, the
independence of the elections of the two top state officers and the
possibility that they will be from different parties might support a re-
form that allows the Lieutenant Governor to move up after a success-
ful recall.  Her administration is more likely to break from the policies
of the previous governor, which is the point of a recall.  On balance,
however, this proposal has more drawbacks than promise, in my view,
and is very unlikely to win the voter approval necessary to change the
constitution.
In addition to clarifying the ballot access provisions, consideration
should be given to adopting some sort of runoff system to ensure that
a successor is not elected with a very small plurality—perhaps with
fewer votes than those voting against the recall.  That possibility, which
did not occur in 2003 because Schwarzenegger’s popularity provided
him a substantial victory and more votes than the “no” votes on the
recall, could undermine the legitimacy of the successor’s administra-
tion.  Even though a “no” vote on recall is not the equivalent of a vote
for the incumbent—after all, some who vote “no” may just be opposed
to a recall without having much enthusiasm for the current occupant
of the office—it could be difficult for a newcomer to govern after a
narrow plurality win.  Some commentators have suggested that an in-
stant runoff process could allow a decision to be made with one elec-
                                                          
73
E.g., Mark Ridley-Thomas & Erwin Chemerinsky, Commentary, Now that It’s
Finally Over, Let’s Revamp the Recall, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2003, at B15.
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tion.74  Alternatively, a traditional runoff held shortly after the recall
election would not be terribly disruptive because the recalled gover-
nor would remain in office in the interim.  As the California experi-
ence demonstrates, the state continues to function without serious
problems during the lame-duck period.
Some attention must be paid, however, to the need to resolve the
recall and return to normal governance relatively quickly.  Accord-
ingly, a proposed reform to elect the successor to the recalled official
in a separate election75 held some time after the recall is problematic
because it lengthens any intermediate period when either a recalled
governor remains in power or a Lieutenant Governor runs a caretaker
administration, while likely also running for the top position perma-
nently.  Those who support separating the two parts of the election
note that it would make the campaign fairer for the political party of
the targeted incumbent.76  Under the current system, party leaders
have a difficult message to sell to voters:  do not vote for the recall be-
cause the governor is a strong leader who should be retained, but also
vote in favor of a different copartisan to succeed him should the recall
succeed.  This mixed message may confuse voters, or strike a false
note with them, and thus harm both the effort to retain the incum-
bent and the campaign for the strongest copartisan.77  Holding two
different elections, with the possibility of a third election should a
runoff be allowed, has its drawbacks, however.  The period between a
recall and successor election would necessarily be longer to allow a full
campaign than the period between a combined election and any nec-
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essary runoff.  The proposal to separate the two decisions is also unat-
tractive because a voter’s decision whether to recall the governor is
necessarily dependent on who is likely to succeed the incumbent.
Structuring a process so that voters cannot be sure who will be run-
ning to replace the recalled official denies voters important informa-
tion when they make the initial decision on the recall.
My preference is for a simultaneous election of a successor at the
time of the recall vote, with serious consideration given to an instant
runoff to quickly resolve any close plurality vote.  Moreover, although
states differ on this issue, it is sensible to prohibit the incumbent tar-
get of the recall from running to succeed himself; after all, if he is re-
called, he has received a resounding vote of no confidence.  Disallow-
ing his candidacy in the successor election may mean that a recalled
official in the last term of a term-limited office may never be able to
run for that office again.  In California, for example, the constitu-
tional term limitation would preclude Gray Davis from running again
for governor because if he won, he would serve more than two
terms—in this case, about a year more than two terms.78  Where term
limits do not apply, a recalled official should be able to run in elec-
tions after the replacement election and to convince voters that he has
learned from his mistakes or that they were wrong to throw him out.
The recall election was notable for more than the sheer number
of candidates; the structure, which dispensed with party primaries and
allowed candidates direct access to the general election ballot, meant
that voters could choose among different kinds of candidates.  In tra-
ditional elections, Californians nominate party candidates for the
general election through partially closed party primaries in which only
registered party members and independents are allowed to vote.  Ac-
cess to the primary ballot is relatively easy and is not controlled by the
party, which may endorse one of the candidates but cannot block bal-
lot access.  However, the semi-closed primary format means that moti-
vated party activists who tend to vote disproportionately in such elec-
tions exert substantial influence over who appears on the general elec-
tion ballot.  A candidate like Schwarzenegger would have faced sig-
nificant hurdles to winning the party primary because committed Re-
publican activists find many of his positions on social issues distasteful
and doubt his commitment to fiscal conservatism.79  Schwarzenegger
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ran as a relatively moderate candidate, publicly relying on a bipartisan
group of advisers and underscoring his relatively liberal positions on
abortion and gay rights, while also seeking to establish his antitax cre-
dentials.  Richard Riordan, a candidate with similar policy positions
(although with substantially more political experience), was defeated
in the 2002 Republican primary by a much more conservative Bill
Simon.80  Although candidates like Simon may move slightly to the
center in the final campaign, their public positions during the primary
undermine the credibility of those moves.
Disappointed with their choices in general elections, a majority of
voters in California adopted a blanket primary system in 1996.81  A
blanket primary format, in which voters can vote in different party
primaries for different offices, is likely to result in the election of can-
didates who appeal more to the median voter than to activists.  Blan-
ket primaries are moderating devices designed to move political par-
ties closer to the center.  In the words of a California ballot pamphlet,
blanket primaries are intended to “‘weaken’ party ‘hard-liners’ and
ease the way for ‘moderate problem-solvers’ . . . .”82  Blanket primaries,
like other reforms supported by California voters such as term limits,
may be a response to the perception that the candidates produced by
the current system, and the officials elected through it, do not suffi-
ciently share the values and views of the electorate.  In other words,
recent political developments in California, including the recall and
the simultaneous election of a relatively moderate Republican, may be
aspects of a larger effort to reduce the principal-agent slack between
representatives and the represented,83 and to empower the median
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voter.84  Unfortunately for voters trying to use the blanket primary to
change the kind of candidates they can vote for in a general election,
the Supreme Court struck down the primary on the ground that it
impermissibly infringed on the First Amendment rights of party
members.85  This holding has led to the invalidation of blanket pri-
mary systems in Washington and Alaska,86 states where the blanket
primary had long been used and, at least in the case of Washington,
had not significantly weakened political parties.87
Jones prohibits the people or legislatures from imposing blanket
primaries on political parties; it does not prohibit the parties them-
selves from adopting different primary systems.  In the wake of Jones,
the major parties in California opened their party primaries to inde-
pendents, although they did not go so far as to allow open primaries.
To respond to voters’ preferences demonstrated by the recall and the
enactment of the blanket primary, party leaders should restructure
their primary rules so that they shift power to the median voter and
away from the party activist.  Parties would not be helpless under such
a system.  Through endorsements, recruitment efforts, campaign
spending, and assistance, parties can influence the outcomes of more
open primaries.
However, the major political parties in California continue to ig-
nore the dissatisfaction of voters with the choices that emerge from
the current structure of primary elections.  In November 2004, Cali-
fornians will vote on an initiative that would require all state and fed-
eral elections, except for the presidential election, to be nonpartisan,88
an option that the Court in Jones left open as a constitutionally permis-
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sible reform.89  Rather than responding pragmatically by further open-
ing their primary selection process, the parties are obstinately fighting
to retain the status quo.  The legislature placed a competing question
on the November ballot requiring partisan primaries,90 as well as ac-
tively opposing the nonpartisan primary initiative.91
The preference for more open candidate selection processes that
favor moderates is only one of the various messages of the recall elec-
tion with broader application to California and the nation.  The
strong anti-incumbent tone in exit interviews with voters, as well as
surprising voting behavior by certain ethnic and other demographic
groups, have no doubt provided strategists food for thought as they
look toward the 2004 presidential election and the next statewide elec-
tion in California.  For example, women and Hispanic voters sup-
ported both the recall and Schwarzenegger in much larger numbers
than had been predicted.92  The lukewarm support Hispanic voters
provided Bustamante, the Hispanic Democratic candidate, was a sur-
prise, and one that both major parties will assess in future months.93
III.  LAWSUITS AS POLITICAL WEAPONS
The short campaign period was nonetheless long enough for
more than fifteen lawsuits to be filed in federal and state courts.94  Had
the election been closer, more lawsuits would likely have been filed in
                                                          
89
See Jones, 530 U.S. at 585-86 (noting that a “nonpartisan blanket primary”—
which would “ensure more choice, greater participation, increased ‘privacy,’ and a
sense of ‘fairness’”—would not infringe on a party’s constitutional right of association).
90
Proposition 60, Proposed Amendment to Article II, available at
http://www.ss.ca.gov/elections/elections_viguide_pg04.htm (last visited Sept. 20,
2004).
91
See Christian Berthelsen, Senate Elections Bill Undermines Open Primary Ballot Initia-
tive, S.F. CHRON., June 22, 2004, at B3 (reporting that the legislature’s proposed
amendment “enjoyed a wide margin of bipartisan support”).
92
See Matt A. Barreto & Ricardo Ramirez, Minority Participation and the California
Recall:  Latino, Black, and Asian Voting Trends, 1990-2003, 37 PS:  POL. SCI. & POL. 11, 13
(2004) (observing that Bustamante “received significantly lower than execpected levels
of [Democratic] support”); The Recall Election:  Times’ Exit Poll Results, L.A. TIMES, Oct.
9, 2003, at A26 (breaking down the election results by demographics).
93
See Jonathan Nagler & R. Michael Alvarez, Latinos, Anglos, Voters, Candidates, and
Voting Rights, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 393, 430 (2004) (noting that “a strong 44% of Latino
voters did not support Bustamante, with 41% of Latino voters supporting one of two
Anglo Republican candidates”).
94
See Karen Getman, Recall Litigation, Update (Oct. 17, 2003) (on file with the
University of Pennsylvania Law Review) (prepared for the Gubernatorial Recall Process
Forum at USC (Oct. 21, 2003)) (detailing the issues and status of all recall cases).
266 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 153: 239
its aftermath.  Election-related lawsuits are not a new phenomenon,95
particularly in the context of direct democracy where federal and state
courts have invalidated initiatives or ruled that they cannot appear on
the ballot.  The litigation in the California recall, however, seems
quantitatively and qualitatively different from what we have previously
witnessed.  Moreover, the amount of media attention focused on the
lawsuits appears greater, transforming litigation into a method to
make issues salient for journalists and voters.  These two changes feed
on each other as the media attention encourages more filings and as
more filings catch the attention of journalists.  Some of the recall cases
were entirely driven by political considerations, such as the early law-
suit96 attacking the qualifications of the petition circulators mostly on
grounds rejected by Supreme Court precedent in the context of initia-
tives and likely applicable to recalls.  The main purpose of the lawsuit
was not to succeed in court, but rather to frame the recall effort as
controlled by out-of-state wealthy interests and thus not a true Califor-
nia grassroots movement.  The media is now particularly focused on
election-related lawsuits after Bush v. Gore, so a court battle was an ef-
fective way to make the nature of the petition drive apparent to poten-
tial voters.
One puzzle in politics is why a particular process that has been
available to strategic actors in the past suddenly becomes a more im-
portant tool in their arsenal.  For example, initiatives were used exten-
sively in the early part of the twentieth century, and then fell into dis-
use, only to reemerge as a potent political force after the success of
California Proposition 13 in 1978.97  In part, the rejuvenation of direct
democracy occurred because a political entrepreneur “discovered” the
potential of the largely moribund process.  His success inspired others
to follow his lead, spawning an industry that fostered further use of
initiatives.98  The catalyst for the aggressive use of lawsuits as a political
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strategy in the recall election was the litigation surrounding the 2000
presidential election, which successfully aborted the political process
and ensured a Bush victory.
Even without Bush v. Gore, some litigation probably would have oc-
curred during or after the recall campaign for several reasons:  the
unusual nature of a statewide recall election, the shortened campaign
period and its interaction with a planned change in voting technology
effective March 2004, and problems inherent in poorly drafted and
little-used election laws.  However, Bush v. Gore also played a vital role.
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s prediction that Bush v. Gore was a “one
of a kind case”99 was premature (or perhaps wishful thinking).  Al-
though the Supreme Court may never cite it as “precedent . . . on any-
thing,”100 as Ginsburg forecast, the case taught political strategists that
the courts are yet another battleground in a campaign.  That lesson
was extended in the recall as strategists demonstrated that the judicial
fight need not wait until after votes have been cast.  Indeed, recourse
to the courts may serve its political purposes best if a lawsuit is brought
during the campaign when it can affect voter turnout and how votes
are cast.
Although plaintiffs challenging aspects of the petition drive, cam-
paign, or election were successful in only one of the cases,101 the law-
suits affected the recall in significant ways.  The most potentially dis-
                                                                                                                                
CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM:  A SOURCEBOOK 167, 167-68 (Anthony Corrado et al. eds.,
1997) (noting that the ability of parties to collect soft money contributions had existed
since the amendment of the Federal Election Campaign Act in 1974); Diana Dwyre &
Robin Kolodny, National Political Parties After BCRA, in LIFE AFTER REFORM:  WHEN THE
BIPARTISAN CAMPAIGN REFORM ACT MEETS POLITICS 83, 89-90 (Michael J. Malbin ed.,
2003) (noting that political parties “figured out how to fully take advantage of the soft
money-issue advocacy ‘loophole’” in 1996).  This loophole with respect to party soft
money has apparently been closed by BCRA, and the Supreme Court upheld these
provisions in McConnell v. FEC.
99
See Charles Lane, One More Round for Bush v. Gore, WASH. POST, Sept. 16, 2003,
at A1 (reporting Justice Ginsburg’s doubts that Bush v. Gore will ever be useful prece-
dent).
100
Id.  Other courts, however, likely will use it as precedent.  See, e.g., Black v.
McGuffage, 209 F. Supp. 2d 889, 898-99 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (applying Bush v. Gore in deny-
ing defendants’ motion to dismiss in a lawsuit challenging punch card voting machines
as violating equal protection).  And a panel of the Ninth Circuit would have delayed
the recall election using Bush v. Gore as precedent had the decision not been overruled
by the en banc panel.  See Southwest Voter Registration Educ. Project v. Shelley, 344
F.3d 882, 895 (9th Cir.) (en banc) (per curiam), vacated by 344 F.3d 914 (9th Cir. 2003)
(en banc).
101
See Partnoy v. Shelley, 277 F. Supp. 2d 1064 (S.D. Cal. 2003) (ruling that Cali-
fornians could vote in the election for governor even if they did not vote on the recall
itself and holding unconstitutional the statute that required a vote in the recall as a
condition to vote for a successor).
268 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 153: 239
ruptive lawsuit, the challenge to the punch card voting machines used
in the most populous counties in the state, occurred at the end of the
period to register to vote and at a time when many absentee ballots
were being cast.  The three-judge appellate panel rendered an opin-
ion a week before the deadline for voter registration; had this opinion
gone into effect, the election would have been delayed, perhaps until
March.102  The en banc panel did not reverse the decision until the day
after the deadline for registration had passed.  Some who might have
registered to vote may have been discouraged from doing so because
they thought the election had been postponed.  Although registration
for the recall was substantial, the uncertainty caused by the litigation
likely deterred some potential registrants.
Lowenstein has argued that the opinion, even though superseded,
caused other mischief, including disrupting candidates’ fundraising
and other strategic planning, as well as diverting voters’ attention away
from the election.103  These harms are overstated in this case.  The pe-
riod between the opinion of the three judges and the reversal by the
en banc court was brief, so candidates probably did not substantially
change their strategies or find their fundraising abilities impaired.
Certainly, their campaigns would have been significantly disrupted
had the election been postponed; fundraising and money-spending
plans had been determined in light of the condensed campaign pe-
riod.  The fear that voters were sidetracked by the coverage of the law-
suit is also not convincing.  The media attention on the opinions and
the televised oral argument before the en banc court may well have
heightened voter interest in the recall rather than diverted it.
Nonetheless, Lowenstein’s larger point is valid.  Had the election
been postponed, election officials would have faced serious problems.
With widespread use of absentee voting in California, hundreds of
thousands of ballots had already been submitted.  In modern elec-
tions, the actual process of voting now takes place over many days--
sometimes weeks—so developments in the last days of a campaign can
implicate the voting process itself.  The Los Angeles County Registrar
informed the en banc panel that she did not believe the unusual recall
ballot could be accommodated in the March election that was sched-
uled to serve as a test of a new voting technology, the Inka-Vote sys-
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tem.104  Not only is new technology prone to unexpected “bugs” when
it is first implemented, but the InkaVote system has a limited capac-
ity.105  The recall plus the regularly scheduled presidential primary
would have resulted in a ballot too long for the system.106
Perhaps dealing with such logistical challenges is warranted in a
few cases where an election is plagued by serious constitutional infir-
mities that cannot be remedied after the election.  Suits brought un-
der section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, which have occasionally de-
layed elections, are examples of such cases.  Those who advocate judi-
cial intervention tend to raise appalling hypotheticals where the state
action described would egregiously deprive many voters of their right
to cast a ballot that will be counted.  Such a parade of horribles is a
neat advocate’s trick, but it is far removed from the reality of modern
elections.  The trend since Bush v. Gore is for political actors to use liti-
gation as another tool to change the rules once the game has started
by demanding something near to perfection from elections and those
who run them.  In many of these cases, lawsuits are brought opportu-
nistically to force changes by judges who often do not have good in-
formation about the implications of any decision in the larger context
of the election.  For example, the three-judge panel did not have in-
formation about the logistical difficulties of a March election when it
rendered its decision; instead, the arguments were presented in a let-
ter from the Los Angeles County Registrar to the en banc panel.  The
price of judicial involvement is uncertainty and the specter of unfair-
ness as political battles are fought in the courts.
One way to combat this new and more aggressive use of litigation
as a political tool would be for the courts to refuse to entertain such
suits in all but the most extreme cases.  Although filing the suits would
still result in some publicity and help frame political issues in ways that
would help particular candidates, media and public attention would
wane if courts backed out of the political realm and refused to follow
the Supreme Court’s example in the 2000 election.107  Unfortunately,
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many judges do not seem eager to exit from the political thicket, al-
though it is noteworthy that only one of the plethora of recall cases
succeeded in court (with some of the section 5 cases resulting in ac-
tion by the Department of Justice).  Perhaps reiteration of the strong
presumption that courts should not intervene in elections would re-
verse the post-Bush v. Gore developments.108  Some firm statement by
courts is necessary to convince political actors not to resort to lawsuits
when it serves their political interests.  Candidates will use lawsuits as
long as there is a potential benefit of political and media exposure
and very little risk of harm just as politicians have continued to file
suits on internal congressional matters and interbranch disputes even
though the D.C. Circuit and the Supreme Court have severely limited
the possibility of success.109  But an inhospitable judicial doctrine
would surely deter some of these cases, and the press would not be as
interested in clear losers.
Other solutions that do not depend on the judiciary’s commit-
ment to passive virtues might offer more promise of reducing the
number of election-related lawsuits.  Often elections that are plagued
by judicial challenges result in sweeping election law reform,110 and
California should immediately embark on a project to clean up and
modify its rules concerning recalls.  Constitutional changes are diffi-
cult, so, for example, changing the threshold of signatures required to
qualify a recall for the ballot may be difficult to achieve.  However, the
legislature has the power to amend the election laws, and it should
begin to address issues raised by the many lawsuits.111
The legislature should consider whether it is appropriate to place
on the recall ballot any initiatives that have qualified and are awaiting
a vote.  The en banc panel of the Ninth Circuit suggested strongly that
the shortened recall campaign period was not conducive to thoughtful
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consideration of other ballot questions.112  The laws governing state-
wide recall elections must be rewritten to eliminate problems like the
failure to provide workable ballot access regulations.  The campaign
period should be reassessed and perhaps extended slightly to account
for the logistics of holding a statewide election with tens of thousands
of polling places.  Other issues that could have given rise to litigation
but did not should nevertheless be addressed.  Thought should be
given to what would happen if a governor resigned before the election
but after the petitions were verified by the Secretary of State.113  Some
registrars permitted overseas absentee ballots to be faxed, which raised
the question of whether faxed ballots violate the requirement of a se-
cret ballot.114
As reforms are debated, drafters must work to avoid adopting
changes that actually increase the opportunity for judicial involvement
in the political realm.  One proposal that has been discussed would
amend the constitutional recall provisions to set forth only certain
grounds that could support a recall.115  Currently, the California Con-
stitution requires groups seeking a recall to provide reasons and to
include those reasons on the petitions that they circulate.116  The ex-
planation for the recall is provided to voters in the Official Voter In-
formation Guide.  Unlike impeachment,117 the state’s recall provisions
do not specify particular grounds that may sustain a recall.  In my
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view, that constitutional silence is appropriate.  Recall is aimed at re-
moving officials who have acted “corruptly” in the sense that they are
no longer representing the people but are serving the interests of a
powerful minority.  This kind of “corruption” is very difficult to define
or specify; it is something more ineffable than bribery or outright con-
flict of interest.  It is the kind of concern that motivates campaign fi-
nance reform efforts, lobbying reform, and other “good government”
initiatives.  The protection against the inappropriate use of recall is
not through additional substantive standards that attempt to define
something that is context-specific and hard to precisely delineate.
The protection should be procedural.  This is the same sort of protec-
tion provided by the federal Constitution in the case of expelling a
member of Congress.118  The state constitution provides no substantive
criteria for the legislature, but protects against misuse through super-
majority voting requirements.  Accordingly, constitutional reform of
recall should target the signature threshold, but with the objectives of
direct democracy in mind, and other procedural hurdles designed to
ensure that there is widespread dissatisfaction with an official before
she is recalled.
If drafters disagree, however, and include substantive grounds that
are the sole grounds for a recall,119 they should be careful not to invite
judicial meddling in the process.  To be consistent with the purpose
behind the recall, the criteria must include some notion of corruption
or overcompliance with the wishes of powerful minority interests.  To
limit recall to misconduct in office amounting to or close to criminal
behavior—the grounds that usually support impeachment—would
unduly constrain the recall mechanism.  The use of vague standards
like “corruption,” however, will invite judicial second-guessing, and
any intervention is likely to be generally hostile toward recall efforts
because judges are wary of direct democracy and of unusual political
arrangements that seem chaotic or dangerous.120  Vikram Amar has
proposed that the constitution specify the permissible bases for a re-
call because this reform “might make some would-be signers a bit
more thoughtful,” but he is careful to propose that the adequacy of
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the reasons given in a particular petition drive should be unreviewable
by either the Secretary of State or the courts.121
Bush v. Gore did not invent election-related litigation.  Close and
contentious elections have spawned litigation in the past, although
more frequently lawsuits are brought after, rather than before, the
election.  But the Supreme Court’s unwise intervention into the 2000
presidential election legitimated a more activist judiciary in this arena.
It demonstrated that judges could essentially decide an election with-
out much harm to their reputation,122 and it taught wily political
strategists a new trick.  Not surprisingly, political actors are now push-
ing the boundaries, moving litigation earlier into the election process.
It may be difficult to put this genie back in the bottle as long as there
are at least some judges willing to entertain the cases and as long as
the litigation garners media attention.
IV.  THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY
AND DIRECT DEMOCRACY
The recall forcefully underscores the interaction between repre-
sentative democracy and direct democracy.  A recall is essentially a
popular vote of no confidence in a public official that precipitates an
electoral evaluation before the regularly scheduled vote.  Cronin con-
cludes his analysis of the recall by labeling it “a helpful yet crude safety
valve at the state and community levels.”123  Critics of the California
recall decried it as undemocratic because it undermined an element
of representative democracy, namely, regularly scheduled elections
which allow for political accountability at regular periods but do not
introduce the specter that one unpopular decision will result in back-
lash that can oust an official before the end of her term.  Although
this feature of representative democracy may have some advantages, it
is not a necessary part of democratic institutions.  Parliaments can be
dissolved unexpectedly upon a vote of no confidence, for example.  In
California and some other states, constitutions set up a hybrid demo-
cratic system that has elements of representative democracy and ele-
ments of direct democracy.  Critics may argue that California has the
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balance wrong—with too much popular involvement and not enough
leeway for representatives—but the elements of direct democracy are
not “undemocratic.”124  Rather than attacking problems by mislabeling
them, commentators would do better to devise reforms to ensure that
California’s hybrid system leads to better governance.  A hybrid system
appropriately includes the possibility of recall as one way for voters to
reduce the principal-agent slack that inevitably develops between vot-
ers and representatives, particularly when the latter are not term-
limited.
This recall election underscored the relationship between the two
parts of the state’s hybrid system in several more subtle ways than its
role as a popular device to remove a representative.  First, the recall
was possible in part because turnout for the 2002 gubernatorial elec-
tion was so anemic that the threshold for ballot qualification was un-
usually low.  Remember that the trigger for ballot access is tied to a
percentage of those voting in the last election for the office.125  Thus,
the public’s lack of enthusiasm for the lackluster candidates in the
previous regular election—Gray Davis and Bill Simon—resulted in a
low turnout, which in turn made all of the tools of direct democracy
easier to wield.  Ironically, part of Gray Davis’s strategy in the 2002
election was to depress voter turnout, setting the stage for his un-
precedented ouster.  Not only are initiatives and recalls formally less
difficult to use when voter dissatisfaction yields low turnout, but voter
disgust with politicians encourages groups seeking change to bypass
the traditional legislative process.
Second, many have argued that the budget problems faced by
California are caused in part by the frequent use of initiatives to com-
mit budgetary resources to particular projects.  The concern with the
influence of initiatives on budget resources is that when lawmakers
begin work on the state’s annual budget, they find a tremendous
amount of revenue has already been committed to particular projects
and is not available for uses determined appropriate by lawmakers.
For example, Proposition 98, passed in 1988, mandates that funding
for education from kindergarten through community college at least
equal the previous year’s spending, adjusted for inflation and popula-
tion growth.  It also commits the state to spending half of any budget
surplus on education, which then goes into the base for computing
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next year’s financial commitment.126  Under Proposition 98’s terms,
about $30 billion of the state’s budget currently must be spent on
education from kindergarten through community college.127  Other
propositions may indirectly claim a share of the state’s resources.
Proposition 184, the nation’s toughest three-strikes law, would seem to
require significant resources for prison construction and mainte-
nance.  When it was on the ballot, the legislative analyst estimated that
Proposition 184 could cost the state up to $3 billion annually in the
short term and $6 billion annually over the long term, plus $20 billion
in increased prison construction costs.128
The total amount of the budget earmarked each year by initiatives
has become the subject of debate in California and elsewhere.129
Laura Tyson wrote that 70% of the state’s budget has been earmarked
by initiatives; she provided no support, however, for this figure.130  A
study by John Matsusaka attempts to systematically test claims that the
initiative process has effectively removed substantial portions of the
state’s budget from the control of legislative policymakers.  He found
that 32%—not 70%—of the state’s total 2003-2004 budget of $101 bil-
lion was earmarked by initiatives, and that most of the money was
committed to education by Proposition 98.131  He also discovered that
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some initiatives expected to cost the state significant money, such as
the three-strikes law, have not yet affected the state’s bottom line.132
Not only is the amount of “budget paralysis” caused by direct democ-
racy overstated by Tyson and others, according to Matsusaka, but it
seems likely that the state would spend money in ways mandated by
initiatives even without the voter directive.  Californians voted for
Proposition 98 because they value education and want that to be re-
flected in the state’s budget priorities; representatives are likely to
spend a considerable portion of the state’s revenues on education with
or without Proposition 98.  Of course, they might not have allocated
about 30% of the budget to kindergarten through community college
programs, and in cases of fiscal crisis, they might have been forced to
make some reductions in those programs not allowed by Proposition
98’s terms.  However, even with Proposition 98, Schwarzenegger was
able to negotiate a reduction in the mandated increase for one year.133
Matsusaka’s study casts doubt on the claim that direct democracy has
played the major role in budgetary crises, at least to the extent that
the claim is based on earmarking.  Matsusaka is clearly correct that the
budget crisis is more a political crisis than the product of direct de-
mocracy:134  that is, elected officials do not want to face the hard
choices of cutting popular programs, raising taxes, or both.
However, the influence of direct democracy on the state’s eco-
nomic and political environments is more extensive than that caused
by ballot questions which earmark funds.  In California, many of the
structural hurdles that the legislature faces in raising revenue to meet
budget shortfalls are the product of initiatives.  Proposition 13 low-
ered property taxes and limited future increases, making localities
more dependent on income and other tax revenues from the state.  In
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turn, the state has fewer resources to meet its own obligations.  Voters
also imposed a two-thirds supermajority voting requirement on the
legislature for any tax increase.
Other problematic provisions in the state constitution are the
product of legislatively initiated ballot measures.  California has a two-
thirds supermajority voting requirement to pass the state budget,
whether or not it increases taxes—the highest voting threshold for
passing a budget of all the states.135  The constitution limits the
amount of indebtedness that the state can incur to $300,000 (unless
the voters approve higher debt or it is necessary to repel invasion or
suppress insurrection in time of war),136 effectively imposing a bal-
anced budget.  In March 2004, voters amended the constitution by
passing an initiative to explicitly require that the legislature pass a bal-
anced budget each year.  Because voters decided through a popular
initiative to impose legislative term limits in 1996,137 it is inexperienced
lawmakers that confront all of these difficult issues and high voting
thresholds in the budget arena.
Thus, the fiscal and budget crisis in California that governors and
lawmakers have faced over the past few years is the result in part of
structural features of state and local government, many of which have
been imposed by initiative.  Not surprisingly, groups have turned to
the initiative process again to change the structure of state govern-
ment to allow lawmakers more flexibility to deal with difficult eco-
nomic times.  For example, in March 2004 voters were presented with
the Budget Accountability Act, an initiative that would have reduced
the supermajority required to pass a budget from two-thirds to 55%,
had it passed.138  The Schwarzenegger administration successfully
asked the people to approve a $15 billion deficit bond to deal with the
state’s immediate budget crisis;139 the initiative sweetened the deal for
fiscally conservative voters by being tied to passage of another initiative
that requires the legislature to pass a balanced budget and establishes
a reserve fund.140  The important point here, regardless of the details
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of these ballot questions and whether or not they passed, is that the
recent poor performance of representative democracy in California is
partly a consequence of the decisions made through initiatives that
have substantially reduced lawmakers’ options and changed politics in
ways that make it less likely that lawmakers can respond effectively to
fiscal challenges.
This analysis, indicting initiatives and referenda as causes of poor
representative government, overlooks the more complex relationship
between direct and representative democracy.  Although certain struc-
tural changes put in place through popular votes may have made gov-
erning more difficult for state legislators and produced inexperienced
lawmakers less able to make effective policy, the resurgence of direct
democracy in the 1970s was partially the result of public disgust with
and distrust of representative institutions.  As a result, the public has
approved initiatives and referenda that constrain lawmakers; some of
those constraints may well improve the legislature, and some certainly
make effective governing difficult.  The relationship between direct
democracy and traditional representative institutions is circular—each
reacts to the other.  Meaningful reform of either will require attention
to both parts of the democratic system.  For example, proposals to use
direct democracy to change the process of redistricting for federal and
state legislators are promising developments to harness direct democ-
racy to improve representative bodies and to overcome the self-
interest of entrenched players.
A third interaction between direct and representative democracy
was also apparent in the recall environment.  Scholars have increas-
ingly studied the effect of the existence of the initiative process on the
laws considered and enacted by the legislature.  Elisabeth Gerber and
others have demonstrated that lawmakers in states permitting initia-
tives enact a different sort of legislation than do legislators in states
without initiatives.  Gerber terms this effect the indirect influence of
direct democracy.141  She has concluded that, under certain condi-
tions, legislation on issues that are likely to be the subject of popular
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vote will be closer to the preferences of the median voter.142  When stra-
tegic lawmakers understand that their decisions can be second-guessed
by voters if a ballot question is qualified, they take that reality into con-
sideration when determining what laws to pass and the content of those
laws.  Lawmaking does not occur in a vacuum; it is affected by all parts
of the political environment.143
Although Gerber’s work suggests that the initiative process favors
legislative outcomes close to the median voter’s preferences, different
conditions in the political environment can move the legislative out-
come so that it is closer to outlying rather than median preferences.  For
example, if the voters likely to turn out in an election on a ballot ques-
tion have extreme preferences, then the legislative response to head off
a vote will be targeted at appeasing those interests, and not the median
voter’s.144
As this scholarship would predict, the reality of a recall affected the
legislation that was passed by the Democratic legislature and signed by
the governor.  Compromise was reached in the summer of 2003 on a
state budget in part because Davis and the Democrats wanted to “solve”
the current budget crisis, albeit using indebtedness of dubious constitu-
tionality, before the recall vote.  Dozens of bills were passed in the wan-
ing days of the legislative session, often without committee hearings and
through a process called “gut and amend.”  Using this technique, a bill
that had gone through all the constitutionally mandated procedures was
used as a shell with its language replaced by an entirely new and unre-
lated proposal that had not been considered by committee nor been
available for lawmakers to analyze before floor deliberation and the vote.
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In many cases, these laws were not passed to placate the median
voter, but instead they were passed to appeal to voters that Davis and
Democratic legislators believed were likely to vote against the recall.
The laws were intended both to convince relatively liberal voters that
Davis, who as governor had pursued a somewhat centrist agenda, was
responsive to their concerns and to encourage those voters to come to
the polls.  For example, after vetoing similar legislation before, Davis
signed a law permitting undocumented workers to obtain driver’s li-
censes.145  The legislation itself had not changed appreciably, and cer-
tainly not in a way to assuage Davis’s earlier concerns.  Instead, the
threat of a recall prompted legislative action and gubernatorial ap-
proval in the hope that the action would influence the outcome of the
election.  Some of these actions may actually have hurt Davis in the
election; for example, the driver’s license measure generated signifi-
cant opposition to Davis during the recall campaign.146  But miscalcu-
lation is also part of the political process and does not undermine the
scholarly conclusion that politicians act in the shadow of direct de-
mocracy.
Interaction between direct and representative democracy will con-
tinue to be seen during Schwarzenegger’s term.  Schwarzenegger is a
Republican facing a Democratic legislature and working on an agenda
that runs counter to some legislators’ priorities.  Schwarzenegger has
demonstrated that he is willing to resort to the initiative and referen-
dum to enact his agenda over the next few years.  In his first State of
the State address,147 he announced that he would take workers com-
pensation reform to the voters in the fall of 2004 if the legislature did
not quickly send him an acceptable bill, which they soon did.  He has
organized a political committee to raise money for campaigns for bal-
lot measures he supports, as well as for lobbying activities in Sacra-
mento and for coordinating grassroots movements to further his pol-
icy agenda.148  “All of those kinds of reforms we want to put on the bal-
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lot,” he told the California Chamber of Commerce.  “And it will take
some pushing.  It will take TV spots on there, which of course cost mil-
lions of dollars.  So I will be coming back to you and saying, open your
wallets again.”149  This comment illustrates again how a hybrid system
affects campaign finance regulations.  It is ludicrous to think that
Schwarzenegger is not as grateful to people who donate substantial
sums to ensure passage of initiatives crucial to his electoral success as
he would be if they donated directly to his reelection committee.  And
substantial sums are what the Governor has been requesting:  to earn
the title “California Recovery Team Chair,” donors were asked for a
$500,000 contribution to the campaign to pass the $15 billion bond.150
Certainly, this reality supports the FPPC’s decision to extend contribu-
tion limits into the realm of some initiative committees.151
Schwarzenegger will not actually govern entirely by initiative, a
strategy that does not allow for coordinated policy or thoughtful legis-
lating on complex issues.  Initiatives must comport with the single-
subject rule, their language cannot be changed as a result of compro-
mise once they have qualified for the ballot, and they do not allow for
continuous policymaking because voters come to the polls only a few
times a year.  Using ballot questions as a way to circumvent recalcitrant
legislators occasionally may improve democratic institutions; using
them as the main method of governing is inefficient, unwise, and im-
possible.
Schwarzenegger’s rhetoric about resorting to initiatives if the legis-
lature stands in the way of reform is a political strategy.  He is making
a credible threat that he will take issues to the people as part of his
negotiations with an unfriendly legislature.  His threat to use direct
democracy was strengthened significantly in March 2004 by passage of
two initiatives he actively supported, one authorizing a $15 billion
bond and one requiring a balanced budget from the legislature.152  He
spent millions on the campaign, convinced Democrats like Senator
Dianne Feinstein to appear in advertisements for it, and neutralized
the opposition that spent virtually no money making its case to the
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public.153  His clout with voters was decisively demonstrated:  before
Schwarzenegger’s active and personal campaign began, only about
one-third of voters supported his bond, but it won decisively on Elec-
tion Day.154
Lawmakers are pragmatic politicians.  They understand that the
recall reflects general voter distaste for incumbent politicians and
politics as usual.  They also know that Schwarzenegger’s celebrity,
wealth, and popularity may allow him to get around the legislature if
they stand in the way of his policy agenda.  Schwarzenegger’s personal
fortune, his ability to raise money, and the tremendous amount of
publicity that surrounds his every move provide credibility to his
threat to go over the heads of state lawmakers.  Because Schwarzeneg-
ger successfully used direct democracy early in his term, his threat is
especially powerful and likely to leverage compromise.  Legislators
and Schwarzenegger also know, however, that frequent use of direct
democracy to enact laws is unwieldy and costly.  Furthermore, even
with the governor’s popular appeal, success at the polls is not a sure
thing.  Thus, both sides—the governor and the legislature—have in-
centives to reach legislative compromises when the bargaining takes
place in the shadow of the initiative and referendum process that a
popular governor can use to great advantage.
Threatening to use direct democracy has already been a successful
tactic with regard to several of Schwarzenegger’s campaign promises.
Within weeks of his taking office, the same Democratic legislature that
passed the law permitting undocumented workers to get driver’s li-
censes repealed it.  They acted quickly both because they understood
that this law had been extremely unpopular with voters and because
they were aware that Schwarzenegger and his supporters would repeal
the law through a referendum if the legislature ignored the popular
will.  By taking the lead, lawmakers sought to mitigate the fallout from
their unpopular political decision, and they hoped to soothe support-
ers of the law by eliciting a promise from Schwarzenegger to discuss
an “improved” version of the law.155
The influence of Schwarzenegger’s credible threat to bypass the
legislature also played a pivotal role in the negotiations with the legis-
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lative branch about placing a $15 billion deficit bond on the ballot.
The California Constitution requires that a bond of that size be ap-
proved by the people, and the measure could appear on the March
ballot only if the legislature agreed.  If the Governor had been forced
to qualify his proposal through the petition gathering process, the
vote would have been delayed until November, which would not have
been soon enough to avoid drastic budget cuts and substantial and
costly short-term borrowing.  Thus, the Governor needed the coopera-
tion of the legislature, but lawmakers understood that if they did not
reach an agreement, they could be circumvented, albeit at some cost.
Negotiations broke off on the eve of the apparent deadline for placing
a legislative initiative on the March ballot because Democrats would
not agree to the hard spending cap proposed by the Governor and
demanded by Republican legislators.156  Deadlines, however, can often
be postponed, and in the next week of negotiations, Schwarzenegger
agreed to back away from a hard spending cap and to accept instead a
constitutional requirement that the legislature pass a balanced budget
and establish a reserve fund to pay down the deficit bonds and to meet
unexpected financial crises.  Although this compromise upset some
fiscal hardliners in the Governor’s party, it gained enough votes to be
sent to the people in the spring.157
Schwarzenegger’s successful campaign to convince voters to pass
the deficit bond and the balanced budget requirement was crucial—
not just for the state’s fiscal health, but also for Schwarzenegger’s
credibility in future negotiations.  His strength in bargaining comes
from his immense electoral popularity, financial resources, and ability
to attract nearly constant media attention.  With these tools, he can
credibly threaten the legislature with government by initiative and has
already proved he can translate those attributes into success at the
polls.  The Governor and his staff recognize the centrality of the initia-
tive threat to his success as governor.  When his advisers talk of the
need to keep his popularity high, they do not talk just in terms of his
reelection, but mainly about its effect on “his ability to push through
other reforms by ballot initiative.”158
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CONCLUSION
The recall election is a dramatic variation on the long-running in-
terplay between representative institutions and direct democracy.  The
recall has also cast new light on familiar issues relevant to the electoral
process at the national level and in states without the recall process.  It
demonstrates the increasing use of lawsuits as a political weapon, and
it provides perspective on questions that those working in the law of
democracy have been studying—questions relating to political parties,
independent candidates, and ballots.  In short, the recall, when put
into context, is not a radical departure, but it does provide a new way
to frame for the analysis of difficult choices of design of democratic
institutions.
                                                                                                                                
ing to transform momentum from his campaign [on the bond measure] into legislative
victories on workers’ compensation, the state budget and rollbacks of business regula-
tions”).
